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李亦非VS姚非拉：名还是利，追求还是被追求 －－ http://www.superlee.com.cn/?p=51

《反垄断法》的第一次出击，商务部的一纸判决，将汇源的跨国婚姻击成碎片。当事人朱新礼虽然早有了心理准备，但也难免早早地开始憧憬婚后地自由生活。如今，一切都要重归原点，心中真是有苦说不出。关于可口可乐收购汇源案，舆论大致是有点两极分化的。在网络上，我们看到大多数，或者说绝大多数的声音是反对并购的。而在以平面媒体为首的传统媒体中，更多的是乐见其成，至少不会无缘无故地反对。如果说传统媒体依然由社会精英把守着地话，那么互联网在最近几年俨然成为了草根社会地舆论阵地。这毫无疑问是一件好事。民意有了更多舆论表达的途径，使得社会的声音有了更加趋向于多元化的可能。但是，网络，作为媒体的一种形式，我们不必过于夸大了其所能够扮演的角色和所承担的责任。其次，网络上层出不穷的被人称作是“网络暴民”式的言论，也反映出我们这个社会离公民社会，要走的路还很长。

说到互联网，最近的一个大事件就是《魔兽争霸》代理权的易主。我不玩网络游戏，但是我一开始就觉得这场争夺对于九城来说，是凶多吉少的。据说，魔兽的收入占到九城整个收入的90％之多，因而其重要性对于整个公司来说是不言而喻的。可是根据某种普遍的理论说，你越是不想发生的事情，最后往往就会发生。或者用最简单的道理来叙述，那就是永远不要把鸡蛋全都放在一个篮子里。持有绝对议价能力的暴雪，深谙两个争夺者的心理，他自然可以把代理权三年给九城，三年给网易，过了三年再交给九城，然后价格就可以翻了又翻。说到底，自主知识产权才是王道。但是我们也不要遗忘了第九城市，这家由CEO陈晓薇领航的舰队是否有什么招术力挽狂澜，我们不妨拭目以待。

最近还有一件事也吸引了众多财经媒体的注意。那就是谷歌推出了一款新产品——谷歌音乐。它自然有许多吸引人的众多理由：单谷歌这个名字甚至就足够了，音乐搜索也是竞争对手百度的重要利器，以及声称“从不作恶”的谷歌如何来解决音乐版权的问题，这款产品的前景到底如何。还有一件有趣的事是：谷歌音乐的版权合作网站——巨鲸网，是由姚明参与投资的，其创始人和董事长就是曾经的“姚之队”Leader章明基。曾经有人戏称，姚明是中国向美国出口的所有单件商品中最贵的一件。那么我说姚明成功登陆NBA也是过去几年中最成功的营销事件之一恐怕没有人会反对。登陆NBA，姚明不是第一个，也不会最后一个。但是能够如此成功——迅速成为NBA顶级明星的，恐怕是独一无二的。当年王治郅同志领先一步进入NBA，几年后最终回归CBA，其中自然有两人性格，背景，时机，能力的差异。但是章明基所领导的营销团队在姚明背后暗中发力无疑是一个重要因素。所以基本上，我们说每一个成功的球星背后都一个成功的营销团队。这样，我们更有兴趣来看看章明基如何来创造一个明星级的音乐网站。

好了有点扯远了，我们再回来看看谷歌音乐产品本身。在外观上，它秉持了谷歌一贯的简约风格。巨鲸提供了强大的正版曲库，你可以任意试听，还能免费下载。唱片商得到的好处是，与谷歌分享网站上的广告收入。这些特性看起来都合情合理，但是不足以令人WOW。好了，还有一项有趣的功能叫做挑歌：你可以在右侧设置歌曲的节奏/声调/音色/年代/歌手/流派/语言等特性，左侧则会有动画效果展示你搜到的歌曲。这个有趣的功能令人激动的地方在于：某种“邂逅”的感觉。我是说，当你的朋友向你推荐某首歌曲，告诉你很好听时，往往你会觉得不过如此，因为你的预期往往被踢得很高。而餐厅里的某首背景音乐，路边唱片店的一首歌曲或者电视节目的插曲往往更能打动我们。因为你对他们几乎没有预期，当你邂逅它时，才会因为其某种特质被彻底打动。好了，google现在就提供了我们这样一种，可能性，使得你在茫茫曲库中，可以遵循某种可控的方式去邂逅动听的乐曲。我找到的包括张雨生的《一天到晚游泳的鱼》，优客李林《哭砂》，谢安琪《海阔天空》。至于谷歌音乐是否能够成为一款杀手级别的产品——扭转其在中国市场的颓势？在时间告诉我们答案之前，我们尽可以多听听歌。

Not as easy as it looks
Apr 23rd 2009 | BEIJING
From The Economist print edition

A character-forming development

FOR better or worse, Mao Zedong usually came out on top, whether facing Japanese invaders, nationalist warlords or Communist Party rivals. But for all his success in overturning traditional values and institutions, the founder of modern China came up short in his desire to convert written Chinese from its character-based system to an alphabet. Intellectuals resisted fiercely, some out of the belief that China’s writing system was superior to any other, and unified a land of many dialects far better than a phonetic system, others on simple sentimental grounds.

不论是说好或者坏，Mao Zedong常常都是最后的胜者，无论是在面对日本侵略者，民族主义的军阀抑或是共产党的对手。但是这位新中国的创立者在推翻旧有政府和价值的众多成就之外，却有一件事没有成功，就是将中文字从象形字体改革为音形。不少知识分子对此强烈反对，其中一些人认为中文的书写方式优于其它任何方式，它比发音方式更能够统一众多的方言，另外一些反对人士则仅仅是出于感情上的理由。

Many claimed it could not be done, despite the examples of Korea, which managed the trick in the 15th century, and Vietnam which, like China, has a tonal language with many homonyms but switched successfully to an alphabetic system. In the end Mao settled on a halfway step: cutting the number of strokes in some Chinese characters (from 18 to four in the case of feng, which means “abundant”, and is shown above). This set China apart from Hong Kong, Taiwan and most overseas communities. Many purists thought simplifying characters as appalling as eliminating them.

许多人声称这种改革是不可能完成的，尽管韩国是一个例外，在15世纪她就完成了这样的改革。越南和中国类似，她的音形语言中有许多的同音异义字，不过最后成功地转变为了以字母为基础的语言体系。最终，Mao选择了一种折中的方式：那就是减少一些中文字的比划数。（例如对“丰”这个字来说，从18个比划减到4划）这一点将中国大陆同香港、台湾和大部分的海外华人社区区分了开来。许多追求语言纯正主义者
认为，简化汉字同消灭它一样后果严重。

That fierce debate is now being rekindled with the government’s announcement of plans to issue later this year a new list of character modifications, aimed mainly at correcting certain “oversimplifications” undertaken in the past. Some characters will have more strokes added and thus be brought closer to their earlier, more complicated forms. But officials insist the move does not mark the start of a campaign to scrap simplified characters. China, they say, need not move back toward the traditional forms, nor further along the path of simplification. It simply needs to “standardise” things.

这类激烈的论辩，因为政府宣称将在今年晚些时候公布一个新的汉字修改计划而重新燃起，这个计划主要将修正那些过去进行了“过度简化”的汉字。一些汉字将会增加一些笔划，因此会和以前的繁体字更加相像。不过政府官员坚持说，这个行动并不意味着将会废除简体汉字。他们说，中国将不会朝着过去而后退，但也不会继续推进汉字简化的道路。汉字所需要的仅仅就是“标准化”。

This will disappoint Pan Qinglin, a member of the consultative committee that advises China’s government. In March he submitted a proposal to the government calling for a return within ten years to the greater expressiveness and “artistic quality” of the traditional script. Others, however, will be pleased, including the internet commentator who recently compared reviving traditional characters to “asking women to revive the practice of foot-binding”.

这个行动将会使Pan Qinglin失望，他是中国的政治协商委员会成员。今年三月份他向政府提交了一份议案，希望汉字能够在未来十年中，回到更加具有表现力和“艺术特点”的繁体字。而其他人则将会乐见其成，其中包括一些网络评论员，他们最近将恢复繁体字拿来同“让妇女接受缠足”做比较。

Other arguments focus less on deep issues of cultural identity than on practical concerns, such as how hard the new forms will be to learn, how much it will cost to convert signs, replace textbooks and adapt software, and whether the government will pay for the changes. Mao famously argued that “revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture”. It might, however, be reforming orthography.
其它的一些争论则并非关注一些诸如文化统一性的深层问题，而是聚焦于实际的担忧，例如新的字体学起来有多难，为此而更换标识、课本和电脑软件将会耗费多少成本，以及政府是否将会为这些变化而买单。Mao有一句名言说：“革命不是请客吃饭，也不是写小说和画图”。这也许说的一点也不错，就像改革汉字书写这件事。

Intellectual property in China 知识产权在中国  思想的斗争
Battle of ideas
Apr 23rd 2009
From The Economist print edition
Chinese companies are enforcing patents against foreign firms

FOR over a decade Schneider Electric of France has bombarded a Chinese firm, Chint Group, with lawsuits accusing it of copying its technology. But the tables turned on April 15th when the two companies settled an infringement case—with the French firm forking over $23m to Chint. The rich settlement against a foreign firm is a landmark. It serves as a reminder that Chinese companies are just as eager to defend patents as Western firms, and that China’s intellectual-property regime has been tightened in recent years.

在最近的十年中，法国施耐德公司一直对一家中国公司正泰集团提起法律诉讼，指控其拷贝了自己的专利技术。不过4月15日的针对这2家公司的侵权纠纷以判决法国公司向正泰支付超过2300万美元的赔偿而应人瞩目。对一家外国的赔偿判决金额如此之高，使其成为了一个里程碑。这个事件提醒人们，中国公司如今和西方公司一样渴望保护专利权，同时中国的知识产权保护体系也在最近几年严厉起来。

Long the workshop of the world, China wants to be the brains as well. The country’s patent office leads the world in patent
applications, more than 800,000 of which were filed in 2008. Most are for “petty” patents: middling technology that undergoes minimal review and receives only a 10-year term. Such patents are usually derided by research-intensive Western firms—but Schneider was stung by one that had been issued to Chint. And Chinese firms are increasingly filing “invention” patents that are rigorously scrutinised and receive 20 years of protection, as in the West (see chart). This year Chinese companies are poised to surpass foreign ones in receiving invention patents in China.
长期以来作为世界工厂的中国，也希望能够成为世界的创新基地。中国商务部专利局在2008年就收到了超过80万分专利申请，位列全球之冠。其中大部分的申请是“小型”的专利：就是那些接受最小程度审核，受10年保护的中等技术。这类专利常常受到研究能力雄厚的西方国家所嘲笑，但是施耐德正是在一项正泰注册的类似专利上栽了跟头。中国公司正加紧进行“创造类”的专利申请，这类专利和在西方一样，受到严格的审核，并有20年的保护期。今年，中国公司获得的创造类专利保护在数量上将会超过外国公司。

With the rush for patents has come an increase in disputes. Since 2006 more patent lawsuits have been filed in China than anywhere else, even litigious America. Most pit domestic firms against each other, but in recent years foreigners have found themselves on the receiving end too. In December Samsung, a South Korean conglomerate, was ordered to pay compensation to Holley, a Chinese telecoms firm. The recent victories and lucrative awards will open the floodgates to more suits, predicts Tony Chen of Jones Day, a law firm.
随着专利申请的加速，专利纠纷的数量也开始增多。2006年以来，中国发生的专利权诉讼案件比任何其它国家包括好诉讼的美国都要多。其中大部分是本土公司之间的纠纷，但是近年来，外国公司也发现自己越来越多地坐到了被告席上。去年12月，韩国三星集团被判决向一家中国电信公司华立支付赔偿。Jones Day律所的Tony Chen预测，进来的胜诉案例以及巨额的赔偿将会导致更多的诉讼。

Intellectual property is relatively new to China. Patents date back to Venice in the 15th century, but Communist China did not allow them until 1985. Since 2006 it has pursued a deliberate policy of gathering as many patents as possible and developing home-grown technologies—not least because Chinese companies pay around $2 billion a year in licensing and royalties to American firms alone, according to America’s Bureau of Economic Analysis.
只是产权对中国来说相对还是一个新鲜事物。专利权的但是可以追溯到15世纪的威尼斯，但是中国直到1985年才承认这一点。2006年开始，经过深思熟虑之后，中国开始推行支持专利申请和研发国家自有技术的政策，这不仅仅是因为根据美国统计局的数据，每年中国公司支付给美国的专利和版权使用费超过了20亿美元。

Chinese firms are also increasingly seeking patents abroad, a sign that they plan to protect their technology when exporting it to rich countries. They won 90 patents in America in 1999 but last year they received 1,225. That is still relatively few—IBM, an American technology giant, receives around 3,000 a year—but it is increasing quickly. Because it takes three to five years to issue a patent, the number issued to Chinese firms is expected to soar soon. The quality of patents issued in China is also improving. Revisions to the patent law that take effect in October strengthen the requirement for a patent’s novelty, bringing it up to global standards. Stronger patents are easier to enforce, opening the door to more lawsuits.
中国公司也开始更多地在国外申请专利保护，这表明了他们计划在向发达国家出口时也能保护自己的技术。1999年中国公司在美国进行了90项专利保护申请，但是去年达到了1225项。这个数字相对来说也是微乎其微的，美国的科技巨头IBM一年就要进行3000项专利申请，不过这个数字也在快速增长。因为一项专利申请一般需要3-5年，所以这个数字预计将很快会出现飞跃。中国公司申请的专利质量也在提高。10月份生效的专利法修正案加强了对于专利创造性的要求，使其同国际标准持平。严格的专利更加容易得到执行，也打开了同学法律诉讼的大门。

All these trends are important because countries that create intellectual property eventually enforce it as well, explains Dominique Guellec of the OECD. America, it is worth remembering, was the great copyright and patent infringer when it was a developing country in the 18th century.
经合组织的Dominique Guellec解释说，所有的这些趋势都是十分重要的，因为当一个国家创造了知识产权，最终她也将会对其进行保护。值得记住的是，18世纪，当美国还是一个发展中国家时，她就曾经是一个侵犯版权和专利最严重的国家。

Vietnam and China 越南和中国
Bauxite bashers

Apr 23rd 2009
From The Economist print edition

The government chooses economic growth over xenophobia and greenery
政府选择了经济增长而非排外主义和温室问题
IN A one-party state where people are routinely jailed for criticising government policy, it is rare for all but the most brave or foolhardy to speak out. But a government plan to allow a Chinese company to start mining some of the massive reserves of bauxite lying beneath Vietnam’s verdant Central Highlands has provoked an unprecedented backlash from an unlikely assortment of critics. They include a nonagenarian war-hero, Vo Nguyen Giap, a dissident monk, Thich Quang Do, and a slew of leading scientists and environmental campaigners.
在一个人民常常因为会批评政府而被关进监狱的一党国家，毫无保留地表达自己的观点无疑是一个最勇敢、又或者是有勇无谋的行为。但是当越南政府计划允许一家中国公司开采位于越南中央高地下储量丰富的铝土矿时，这一举动引发了始料未及的激烈反对，这些反对来自于一群互相毫无关联的批评人士。其中包括一位90多岁的战争英雄Vo Nguyen Giap，一位持不同政见的和尚Thich Quang Do和一批知名的科学家与环保活动者。

Vietnam is blessed with the world’s third-largest reserves of bauxite, the raw material for aluminium, and the communist
government is keen to reap the benefits. Under a plan that the prime minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, has called “a major policy of the party and the state”, the government is seeking to attract $15 billion or more of investment to develop bauxite mining and aluminium refining projects by 2025. It has already signed a contract with a subsidiary of Chinalco, a state-owned Chinese mining group, to build one mine and agreed with Alcoa, an American aluminium giant, to carry out a feasibility study for another.
越南被认为是世界上铝土矿储量第三大的国家，铝土矿是提炼铝的原材料，越南的共产党政府非常希望能够因此而获利。在被越南总理Nguyen Tan Dung称作是“党和国家最重要的一项政策”的计划中，政府希望在2025年前吸引超过150亿美元的投资以开发铝土采掘和提炼项目。政府已经同中国国有的中铝集团下属分支签订了协议建设一个矿井，同时还将和美国的铝业巨头美铝公司一起对另一个矿区进行可行性研究。

Critics say the arrival of large-scale bauxite mining in a region that currently grows coffee and other crops could cause irreparable damage to the environment and displace the ethnic-minority groups who inhabit the Central Highlands. Bauxite is usually extracted through open-cast mines, which leave vast scars on the landscape. The process by which it is refined also produces a toxic “red sludge”, which can cause serious pollution if it washes into streams and rivers.
批评人士认为，这些大型铝土矿开采项目的建设将会对这个现在种植咖啡和其它作物的地区造成不可修复的环境危害，同时还将迫使一些居住在中央高地的少数民族被迫离开。一般来说，铝土矿是在露天的矿井中进行采掘的，这将对当地的风景造成巨大的损害。而对其进行提炼的过程将会产生一种有毒的“红色泥土”，如果它进入附近的河流也将造成严重的环境污染。

As if that were not enough, the involvement of a Chinese company in such a controversial project has rekindled latent anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam, which was colonised by its larger neighbour for 1,000 years and fought a short but bloody war against it in 1979. Thich Quang Do, the leader of the outlawed Unified Buddhist Church, claims that Vietnam is “under threat of invasion” because “whole villages of Chinese workers have mushroomed on the plateau, and 10,000 Chinese settlers are expected in the coming year.” His comments have been echoed by Vietnam’s enthusiastic army of bloggers, and an antibauxite-
mining group set up on Facebook, a popular social-networking website, has attracted nearly 700 members. Chinese bloggers are not, it seems, the only ones to resort to inflamed xenophobia. And though much of the opposition is no doubt driven by that feeling, there are also genuine concerns about the lousy environmental records of many Chinese mining companies.
如果这些还不够，那么中国公司参与到这项充满争议的项目中，则更加使得越南社会中潜藏的反华情绪有所复燃。这个越南最大的邻国对其进行了超过1000年的殖民统治，并在1979年两国之间发生了一场短暂但是血腥的战争。Thich Quang Do是被政府认定为非法的统一佛教会首领，他声称越南正在受到“侵略的威胁”，因为“一整村的中国工人在高地上迅速壮大，而未来一年将预计有超过1万名中国定居者。”他的观点受到了越南群情激愤的博客的支持，在Facebook上一个反对铝土计划的群组中有超过700名成员。由此看来，中国的博客并非是唯一表现出排外情绪的人。尽管大部分的反对声音毫无疑问来自于这种情绪，也有不少人的担忧来自于许多中国采矿公司在破坏环境方面的恶略历史。

Whatever the motive, however, the Vietnamese government is nervous about public criticism of China. It recently banned a bi-weekly newspaper called Du lich (Tourism) for three months for running a series of articles about territorial disputes between the two countries. The explanation is that China is Vietnam’s biggest trading partner. Vietnam also runs a massive trade deficit with its neighbour and has been pushing China’s government to invest more in the country to offset the deficit. With foreign direct investment 40% lower in the first quarter of 2009 than it was a year before—and most rich nations short of cash—Vietnam needs Chinese money now more than ever.
无论这些动机究竟是什么，越南政府在面对民众批评中国的声音时难免紧张。最近政府将一家名为Du lich (旅游)的双周报纸关闭了三个月，原因是该报纸刊登了一系列关于两国领土争端的文章。中国是越南最大贸易伙伴，越南对于中国也有巨大的贸易逆差，所以政府正大力推进中国政府能够加大投资额以补偿逆差。2009年第一季度越南的外资直接投资额较去年同期下降了40%，同时发达国家手中又缺少现金，没有比其它任何时候越南更加需要中国的资金了。

Much to the chagrin of the anti-China lobby, Mr Dung, the prime minister, spent a week this month touring China, trying to drum up investment and pledging to make it easier for Chinese companies to operate in his country. Following a meeting with China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, Mr Dung said that the two countries would strive to expand bilateral trade from $20 billion in 2008 to $25 billion by 2010 and try to tackle the trade imbalance.
作为很大程度上对于反华情绪的懊悔，越南总理Dung本月在中国进行了一周的访问，期望能够招揽来投资，并且承诺说将使中国公司在越南开厂更加便利。在同中国总理温家宝的会谈中，Dung说希望两国能够将双边贸易额从2008年的200亿美元在2010年前提升至250亿美元，并将努力解决贸易不平衡的问题。

Hoang Trung Hai, a deputy prime minister, recently told a conference of scientists concerned about environmental damage that Vietnam will not pursue the bauxite mining plan “at any cost”. But the reality is that in straitened economic times, beggars cannot be choosers.
越南副总理Hoang Trung Hai近期在一个讨论环境危害问题的科学家会议上表示，越南不会以“任何代价”作为牺牲来追求铝土开发计划。但事实是，在这样一个艰难的经济时期，乞讨者不可能有太多的选择。

Apr 16th 2009 | HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition
Signs that a giant fiscal stimulus is starting to work
迹象证明庞大的经济刺激计划已经开始起作用

THE Chinese consider eight to be a lucky number because it sounds like the word meaning “prosperity”. And luck, combined with a massive fiscal stimulus, may yet help the government to achieve its growth target of 8% in 2009. Earlier this year, most economists thought such growth was impossible at a time of deep global recession, but some are now nudging up their forecasts.
中国人相信数字8是一个吉利的数字，因为它读起来与“发财”很相近。幸运的是，在巨大的经济刺激之下，政府也许正在迈向其2009年获得8%的经济增长目标。今年早些时候，大部分的经济学家都认为在全球经济深度衰退的情况下，这样的增长是不可能达到的，但是他们中的一些人现在开始调整他们的预测。

At first sight, the GDP figures published on April 16th were disappointing. China’s growth rate fell to 6.1% in the year to the first quarter, less than half its pace in mid-2007. On closer inspection, however, the economy is starting to perk up. Comparing the first quarter with the previous three months, GDP rose at an estimated annualised rate of around 6%, after nearly stalling in the fourth quarter (see chart). By March the economy was gaining more speed, with the year-on-year increase in industrial production rising to 8.3% from an average of 3.8% in the previous two months. Retail sales were 16% higher in real terms
than a year ago, and fixed investment has soared by 30%, signalling that the government’s infrastructure-led stimulus is starting to work.
初看上去，4月16日公布的GDP数字令人失望。截至到今年第一季度，中国的增长率下落至6.1%，还不及2007年中期的一半。可是仔细观察的话，经济正在回暖之中。把第一季度的数据和之前三月相比，GDP的年增长率大约为6%，而去年第四季度经济增长几乎停止。到三月，经济发展开始增速，工业生产指数和上年同期相比从前2月的3.8%增至8.3%。零售额较上年同期增长16%，同时固定投资额大幅增长30%，这显示出政府依靠基础设施建设的刺激计划正在开始生效。

Exports, on the other hand, tumbled by 17% in the year to March and global demand is widely expected to remain weak this year. This is the main reason why some economists expect GDP growth of “only” 5% for 2009 as a whole. But the gloomier forecasts tend both to overstate the importance of exports and to understate the size of the government’s stimulus.
另一方面，今年截止至3月份的出口额下滑17%，大多数预测认为国际市场需求今年将会持续走低。这也是许多经济学家预测2009年整年的GDP增长率将“只有”5%的原因。然而悲观的预测高估了出口的重要性，同时也低估了政府刺激计划的强度。

Contrary to conventional wisdom, China’s sharp economic slowdown was not triggered by a collapse in exports to America.
Its growth began to slow in 2007, well before exports stumbled, driven by a collapse in the property market and construction. This was the result of tight credit policies aimed at preventing the economy from overheating. The global slump dealt a second blow late last year, but China is less dependent on exports than is commonly believed. Exports account for nearly 40% of GDP but they use a lot of imported components, and only make up about 18% of domestic value-added. Less than 10% of jobs are in the export sector.
与传统判断相对的是，中国经济的大幅减速并非由对美国的出口暴减而引发。其经济在2007年出口出现问题前就开始放缓，这是由于房地产市场和建设的崩溃引起的。为避免造成经济过热而推出的信贷紧缩政策造成了则会给结果。去年的国际经济萧条是第二波打击，但是中国对于出口的依赖程度并非由人们认为的那样高。出口额占据了GDP的将近40%，但是他们使用了大量的进口零部件，真正的数字大约只有国内生产值总额的18%。出口行业提供的工作数量不到总量的10%。

If a collapse in domestic demand led China’s economy down, it can also help lead it up again. Not only is China’s fiscal stimulus one of the biggest in the world this year, but the government’s ability to “ask”state-owned firms to spend and state banks to lend means that the government’s measures are being implemented more rapidly than elsewhere. To take one example, railway investment has tripled over the past year.
如果引发中国经济放缓的原因是国内市场需求的下降，那么它也总会再次拉动经济。这不仅因为中国的经济刺激投入额位列今年所有国家前列，而且政府有能力要求国有企业加大支出、国有银行提供更多贷款，这些都意味着政府的计划将会比在其它国家更快地生效。举一个例子，对于火车轨道的投资额是去年的三倍。

Only about 30% of the government’s 4 trillion yuan ($585 billion) infrastructure package is being funded by the government. Most of the rest will be financed by bank lending, which had already soared by 30% in the 12 months to March, twice its pace last summer. JPMorgan thinks that this credit and investment boom could lift GDP growth to an annualised pace of over 10% in each of the next three quarters.
在政府的4万亿元基础建设一揽子计划中只有30%由政府出资。剩余的大部分将由银行提供借款，截至到三月的12月间，贷款总额已经增长了30%，这是去年夏天数字的2倍。摩根大通认为，这股信贷和投资的猛增将会在接下去的三个季度中与去年相比同比提升10%的GDP。

Jonathan Anderson, an economist at UBS, argues that the property market could be as important as the fiscal stimulus in determining China’s fate. After falling sharply last year, housing sales rose by 36% in value in the year to March. Housing starts are still down, but if sales continue to strengthen, construction could pick up in the second half of 2009. That would also help to support consumption: about half of China’s job losses among migrant workers have been in the building industry.
瑞银的经济学家Jonathan Anderson则提出，房地产市场对于未来经济走势的影响将会与经济刺激计划一样重要。房产销售情况在去年大幅下跌以后，今年截至到3月上涨了36%。房屋开工建设数目仍然下降，但如果销售情况继续走强，那么2009年上半年的房地产建设将会好转。这也将有助于巩固消费：中国农民工失业数量的大约一半来自于建筑业。

If construction does recover and infrastructure spending continues to rise, then even if exports remain weak, China could see growth of close to 8% this year—impressive stuff when rich economies are expected to contract by 4-5%. There are growing concerns about the quality of that growth, however. The World Bank estimates that government-influenced spending will account for three-quarters of China’s GDP growth this year. The clear risk is that politically directed lending creates more overcapacity, poor rates of return and future bad loans for banks.
如果房地产建设真的能够恢复，基础建设投入也会持续增加的话，那么即使出口额持续走低，中国今年的增长也有望达到8%。这相对于发达国家大约4-5%的经济负增长来说，是相当了不起的。然而，对于这种增长方式质量的担忧也在增加。世界银行估计，由政府影响的投入将会占到今年中国GDP增长的四分之三。最明显的风险是，这种政治影响下的银行贷款将会造成更多的生产力过剩，返还利率下降以及未来可能的银行坏账。

These are valid concerns. But Andy Rothman, an economist at CLSA, a brokerage, reckons that stateowned firms mainly plan to increase their spending on upgrading existing production facilities, rather than expanding capacity. Also, about half of the increase in investment is on public infrastructure. This will inevitably include some white elephants but, in a poor country, the return on infrastructure investment is generally high. There is no need to build “bridges to nowhere” when two-fifths of villages lack a paved road to the nearest market town.
这些担心是有根据的。但是里昂证券的经济学家估计，国有企业将会主要增加资金投入以升级现有的生产设备，而非提高产能。同时，将近一半的投资增长来自于公共基础建设。这些将不可避免的造成一些浪费，但是在一个贫穷的国家，基础建设的投资回报率一般都很高。在五分之二的乡村都缺乏通向附近城市公路的环境下，也没有必要造一些多余的桥梁。

What about the risks to banks? The last time they were forced to support the government’s stimulus policy, during Asia’s financial crisis in 1998, Chinese banks were left with large non-performing loans. Bad loans will rise again this time, but Tao Wang, also at UBS, argues that banks are in a stronger position than in 1998. China is one of the few countries in the world where bank credit has fallen relative to GDP over the past five years. Banks have an average loan-to-deposit ratio of only 67%, low by international standards, and less than 5% of banks’ loans are non-performing, down from 40% in 1998.
那么对于银行来说风险又有多少?上一次银行被要求支持刺激计划是在1998年亚洲金融危机时，最后留给这些中国银行的是大笔的坏账。这一次坏账又将上升，但是瑞银的Wang Tao认为与1998年相比，银行已经站在一个更加强势的地位上。中国在过去五年的银行信贷相较于GDP是下降的，这是世界上为数不多的有此表现的国家之一。银行的平均贷存比例只有67%，低于国际标准，同时银行的坏账率从1998年时的40%下降到现在的5%。

The biggest task for China is to find a new engine for future growth. It cannot rely on exports, nor can the investment stimulus be sustained for long. Without stronger consumer spending, China’s growth will be much slower than in recent years. Reforms to improve health care and the social safety net will take many years to encourage people to save less.
对于中国来说没，最大的任务是找到未来增长的新引擎。它将不能依赖于出口，而投资刺激计划也难以维持很久。如果没有强大的消费增长，中国的增长速度将会比过去几年下降很多。对于医疗卫生和社会保障体系的改革需要很多年才能使人们减少储蓄。

Andy Xie, an independent economist based in Shanghai, suggests that the quickest way to boost consumption would be for the government to distribute the shares that it holds in state-owned enterprises to households, and to force those firms to pay larger dividends. But the authorities in Beijing are unlikely to take his advice. How else could they lean on big firms to support the economy in times like these?
上海的独立经济学家谢国忠表示，大幅提升消费的最快的办法就是让政府向个人转让其持有的国有企业股权，并迫使这些企业进行大幅的分红。但是北京的官员不太会采取他的意见。在这样的形势下，除了这些大企业，他们又能依靠谁来支持经济呢？

Health care in China 中国的医疗保健，病人将会得到回报么？
Will patients be rewarded?
Apr 16th 2009 | BEIJING
From The Economist print edition

The government’s plans are still something of a mystery
政府的计划或多或少仍然是一个谜

RARELY in Communist China’s history has such an important government policy been debated so openly
for so long. Such deference to public opinion would be cause for celebration were it not for the urgency of
the issue: health-care reform. After years of dithering amid mounting public anger at the often prohibitive
cost of treatment, the government has a plan.
在共产主义中国的历史上，很少有如此一项重要的政府政策会被公开讨论那么长时间。若非考虑到医疗保健改革的时间紧迫性，对于公共意见的这般尊重是值得庆祝的一件事。面对多年来对于高昂医疗费用的众怒，政府有了一项计划。

Two documents issued on April 6th and 7th set out reform targets through to 2020 as well as more specific objectives for the next three years. The broad goals remain unchanged from draft proposals released last October after a delay of several months. Officials say 200m Chinese have no insurance now. But by 2020 China is to have a “relatively robust” government-financed healthinsurance system, with more than 90% of citizens covered by 2011. Also unchanged is the figure of 850 billion yuan ($125 billion), which the government said in January it intended to spend on these reforms during 2009 and the two subsequent years.
在4月6日和7日公布的两项文件中，政府制定了到2020年以及未来三年的更加明确的改革目标。其长远目标相较于去年推迟了数月后于10月公布的草案并没有变化。政府官员表示现在中国有2亿人没有保险。但是到2020年中国将拥有“相对健全”的由政府出资的医疗保险体系。其中在2011前覆盖至少90%的国民。同样没有改变的8500亿人民币这个数字（1250亿美元），这是政府在在一月份时公开的，将在2009年以及未来2年中投入到这项改革中的资金。

The government admits that achieving its goal of building a “safe, effective, convenient and affordable” health service will not be easy. For much of the past two decades, many Chinese lament, the trend has been in the opposite direction. Health-care provision, once rudimentary but accessible and widely admired by other developing countries, has been turned into a profit-driven system notorious for its corruption, indifference and expense.
政府承认说，想要达到这个目标，建立一个“安全、有效、便捷和付得起的”医疗服务并非易事。在过去的20年间，许多中国人为此而悲伤，整个趋势是向反方向发展的。在其它发展中国家，曾经是基本但是易得并且广受称赞的医疗保健产品和服务供应。在中国却变成了一个利益驱动的系统，并且因为其内部腐败、对人的漠视和花费巨大而声名狼藉。

Official recognition of this mess became apparent in 2003 during an outbreak of SARS, an often fatal respiratory ailment. Its spread highlighted the difficulty of handling such emergencies when many Chinese were afraid of going to hospital because of the potential cost. New leaders who took over in 2002 and 2003 tried to consolidate their power by emphasising the party’s concern for the plight of the poor. But it was only in 2006 that work began on drawing up a comprehensive plan for health-care reform.
政府官员对于这种乱象的承认在2003年非典爆发时期显露无遗，非典是一种可能致命的呼吸道疾病。SARS的传播凸显出了处理这种紧急状态时的困难，因为许多中国人担心看病贵而害怕去医院。2002年和2003年新上任的领导人希望突出党组织对于群人困境的关心以巩固自己的权利。但是直到2006年，这种努力才开始聚焦到为医疗体系改革绘制一张彻底的计划。

Even amid the global economic crisis, the government has appeared in no hurry. Many economists argue that the impact of the crisis could be mitigated by stimulating domestic consumption. One way to do this would be to reduce the incentive for households to save money as a precaution against health emergencies. But the recent documents, which were circulated secretly within the bureaucracy for three weeks before being made public, give no clear target even by 2020 for how much citizens can expect to be reimbursed for hospital treatment. Even for those with government insurance, a substantial amount
still usually has to be paid out of the patient’s own pocket. In the countryside, despite the government’s rapid rolling out of a new insurance scheme in the past few years, many peasants still shy away from hospitals.
即便正面临全球经济危机，政府也表现的不紧不慢。许多经济学家主张，刺激国内消费将会减缓危机带来的影响。其中一种方式就是削减住房消费的刺激，鼓励为看病的不时之需而储蓄。但是最近这份在因为官僚作风，正式公布前三周就开始神秘传播的文件中，并未对到2020年有多少公民，能够在就医看病时得到补偿给出明确的目标。即便是对那些拥有政府保障的人来说，仍然需要他们自己从口袋中掏出一大笔钱。在农村地区，尽管最近几年政府已经在新保险制度上投入了许多，许多农村人口依旧避医不及。

A big objective of the reforms is to break the dependence of government-owned hospitals on the payments exacted from patients for tests, medicine and other treatments. Government subsidies account for a tiny amount of hospitals’ revenue. Reports in the state-run press say more than 90% of their income comes from charges (poorly regulated and often excessive) for providing services and medicine. Weaning hospitals and doctors off these sources of funds will be a colossal task.
改革的一大目标将是打破国有医院对于病人体检、用药和其它治疗手段收费的依赖。政府的津贴只是医院收入的很小一部分。官方媒体的报道称，医院收入中的90%以上来自于服务和药品的收费（管理混乱并且常常滥收费）。断绝医院和医生的这笔资金来源将是一个巨大的任务。

The government’s plan is to publish a list this month of essential medicines. Over the next three years, government-run medical facilities will be required to give preference to drugs on this list and profits made on them by health-care providers will be phased out. They will receive extra subsidies to make up for their losses. But hospitals have often profited from illegal mark-ups on medicine and from commissions from manufacturers on the sales of their drugs. The new subsidies are unlikely to take this into account, so hospitals could see their revenues shrink. Hospitals have also proved adept in the past at evading price controls on particular drugs by prescribing other medicines or unnecessary extra tests and treatments.
政府的计划是在这个月发布一个常用药的单子。在未来三年中，国有医疗机构将被要求在开药时优先考虑这个单子上的药，而从药品上获取利润的做法将被逐渐淘汰。医院将会获得额外的津贴以弥补其损失。不过在过去医院也经常从非法的药品涨价和从药品生产商那里获得销售回扣而谋利。新的津贴将不会考虑这部分的损失，因而医院预计仍可能收入会减少。也有证实，医院在过去就已经擅长于开其它种类的药或者根本是不必要的额外检查或者治疗，以避开特定药品的价格控制。

Another big obstacle to reform could be a lack of enthusiasm among local governments. Of the planned 850 billion yuan in spending, officials say only 40% will come from the central government. Provincial and lower-level authorities may be reluctant to divert resources to areas that do not produce immediate benefits in terms of boosting employment and GDP growth.
另外一个改革的巨大障碍将可能是地方政府缺乏热情。在计划的8500亿人民币投入中，官方说其中只有40%来自于中央政府。省级和地方政府将
可能对把资金转到从促进就业和GDO增长的角度看，无法产生即时效益的领域不怎么情愿。

How much of an extra burden local governments will have to bear is still unclear. A deputy minister of finance, Wang Jun, told reporters on April 8th that the 850 billion represented “additional” spending on health care. Caijing, a Beijing business magazine, has pointed out that over the three years, the central government’s annual average share of this would be about 111 billion yuan. This year’s budget for health spending by the central government (including reform-related expenditures) is only 118 billion. The government’s numbers do not appear to add up.
政府还将承担怎样的负担尚不清楚。4月8日财政部的一位副部长Wang Jun对记者说，8500亿代表的是在医疗保健方面“额外”的投入。北京的商业杂志《财经》指出，三年中，中央政府每年平均须支出111亿元。今年对于医疗方面的中央政府预算（包括改革相关的费用）只有118亿元。政府给出的数字似乎有点不合实际。

Online gaming in China  网络游戏在中国 无形的价值
 
Intangible value
Apr 2nd 2009 | HONG KONG 
From The Economist print edition
 
 
Changyou is making a fortune selling items in a virtual world
PERHAPS it should not be a surprise. In the midst of a global capital shortage, the first company to list this
year on New York’s NASDAQ exchange not only needs no money; its source of profit is receiving cash for
items that do not exist.
也许这并不应该是一件令人吃惊的事情。在全球资本匮乏的环境下，今年在纽约纳斯达克上市的第一家公司不仅并不需要钱，它的利润来源还来从并不存在的物品中获取现金。

Changyou is a three-year-old online-gaming business being spun out of Sohu, China’s second-largest
internet portal. The deal was due to be priced on April 2nd, as The Economist went to press, in a nostalgic
reminder of what the stockmarket used to look like. At the top of the expected price range Changyou will
be valued at about $820m, after a special distribution of $100m to its parent. The opening price may be
higher still, given strong demand.
畅游是一家成立三年的网络游戏公司，它从中国第二大门户网站sohu中拆分而出。公司定于4月2日挂牌交易，当《经济学人》前往参加新闻发布会时的情形，令人怀念起股票市场过去的景象。在向其母公司分配1亿美元之后，公司的估值按照预计最高股价大约为8.2亿美元。如果需求强劲，开盘价将可能攀升得更高。

The enthusiasm for Changyou is understandable. Unlike much of the internet, where services have to be
free in order to be popular, Changyou makes money. In short order, revenues have risen to $202m and
profits to $108m. That is because Changyou is one of several Chinese firms to have stumbled upon a
remarkable niche that has grown into a multibillion-dollar industry. Video-gaming developed in America,
Europe and Japan largely around console hardware and its associated packaged software. China initially
banned games consoles, and by diligently failing to enforce intellectual-property laws, it wrecked the
economics of the console business by allowing pirated games to be sold for pennies, thus undermining any
incentive to market them.
市场对于畅游的热情是可以理解的。与大多依靠免费服务换取大众欢迎的互联网公司不同，畅游的确赚钱。在很短的时间内，其收入达到了2.02亿美元，利润达1.08亿美元。因为畅游正是这几家偶然发现了高大书十亿美元细分市场的公司。在美国、欧洲和日本发展起来的电视游戏主要围绕游戏硬件和相关的游戏软件展开。中国起初禁止了游戏硬件，并且坚持不履行知识产权保护的相关法规，由于盗版游戏只要几美分就能获得，这彻底破坏了游戏行业。因而也了扑灭了人们发展游戏行业的热情。

China took a similarly firm line with other forms of entertainment, allowing only limited local production of
films and television programmes, and sharply restricting imports (legal ones, at least). In this desert, the
internet has flourished, at first as a place for pirated foreign films and shows, but over time for online
multiplayer games, too. Companies created a business model based on allowing access from any computer—customers pay as little as 25 cents an hour at internet cafés—but where the computational heavy-lifting is done on their own servers. These provide the background environment and connect the players—in Changyou’s case, as many as 738,000 at a time.
中国对于其它形式的娱乐行业也采取了相同的严密控制，只允许制作有限数量的本土电影和电视作品，还对产品进口严格控制（至少是合法的进口）。在这种荒芜的环境下，互联网开始发达兴旺，一开始是作为盗版外国电影和节目的流传地，渐渐的也催生了网络游戏。网络游戏公司们创造了这样一种商业模式：允许玩家从任何地方接入游戏，用户只需要在网吧支付每小时低至25美分的费用，但是游戏的大量计算过程是在公司自己的服务器上运行。这种方式提供了背景环境并连接了玩家——在畅游的游戏中，同时在线的人数可达73.8万人。

Popular games in China typically feature elves, dwarves or characters that predate the past century of political turmoil. Changyou’s most popular offering, “Tian Long Ba Bu”, began as a book about the travails of a prince, a monk and a beggar, with lots of martial arts. At first Changyou charged subscription fees to play, but abandoned them because multiplayer games are generally more fun with more players. Like most other firms, it now provides free access to its games, collecting revenue from the 10% or so of players who are prepared to pay for in-game extras such as weapons, medicine and shields, says Benjamin Joffe, chief executive of Plus Eight Star, a technology consultancy in Beijing.
在中国流行的游戏中往往包含了侏儒、魔法师或者上世纪政治混乱中的角色形象。畅游最风行的游戏“天龙八部”的故事内容是从一本讲述王子的艰难历程、一个和尚和一个乞丐开始的，并有许多武术的内容。一开始畅游对每个进入游戏的玩家都收取费用，但是因为多人的游戏往往玩家越多越有趣，所以后来取消了这个费用。位于北京的科技咨询公司Plus Eight Star首席执行长Benjamin Joffe说，同其它大部分同类公司一样，它提供免费的游戏接入，而从大约10%愿意为游戏中额外的附件，如武器、药物或者护具支付费用的玩家身上获取收入。

These extras typically cost a few cents, but some are much dearer: Changyou sells a virtual gem, which can be used to enhance a virtual sword, for $180. Demand for these virtual goods depends on their cost, properties and availability, exactly as in the real world, says Mr Joffe. Clever gaming companies constantly monitor demand and tweak supply to maintain their revenues, in a sense fine-tuning their own virtual economies.
这些附件一般标价几美分，但是有些就要宝贵：畅游所出售的一种虚拟宝石，可用来加强一种虚拟的刀，售价为180美元。对于这类虚拟商品的需求决定于他们的售价，用途和实用性，这就像真实世界中一样，Joffe表示。聪明的游戏公司会经常检测这种需求，调节供应以维持他们的收入，这在某种程度上也是在微调公司自己的虚拟经济。

There are risks to Changyou’s business, most notably from competition. Growth recently slowed abruptly. There are more than half a dozen publicly listed Chinese gaming companies, and over 100 more with viable products, according to BDA, a onsultancy based in Beijing. Hundreds, if not thousands, of other companies are eyeing this promising market.
对于畅游的生意，也存在着一些风险，最明显的来自于他的竞争对手。近期公司的增长突然放缓。根据北京的咨询公司BDA的数据，现在已经有超过六家中国的网络游戏公司公开上市，另外还有超过100家公司有着切实可靠的产品。即便没有几千家，也有几百家公司正垂涎于这个广阔的市场。

Still, the battlefield is not as dangerous as it might appear. Before 2006 South Korean and American
companies dominated the market, and the world is full of clever programmers, all of whom are theoretically linked by the internet. But as was the case in console-based gaming, the Chinese government has intervened, says Ning Liu, an analyst at BDA. Licensing of new versions of foreign games has been delayed, and local firms have gradually learnt to develop their own products. In the Chinese business environment, even the virtual world has real walls. 
不过这个战场也并非像它看起来的那么危险。在2006年前，韩国和美国的公司主导了这个市场，世界上到处都是聪明的程序员，理论上他们所有人都由互联网联接在一起。但就像是电视游戏行业的例子一样，中国政府进行了干预，BDA分析师Ning Liu表示。新版本外国游戏的许可证被延缓批准，同时本土公司渐渐地学会了如何开发自己的游戏产品。在中国的商业环境中，即便是在虚拟的世界中也存在着真实的围墙。

Taking the summit by strategy

Apr 8th 2009 | BEIJING
From The Economist print edition

Viewed from home, China and its president, Hu Jintao, had a good G20

THE photograph said it all. Leaders of the world’s biggest economies lined up for the cameras before working out ways of tackling the global financial crisis. There in the middle of the front row, in what the Chinese press construed as the most honoured position to the right of the British prime minister, Gordon Brown, was President Hu Jintao of China. The state-controlled media loved the implicit message. China had taken centre stage.
照片说明了一切。在讨论如何处理全球金融危机之前，世界上最大经济体的首脑们在相机前排开。列在第一排正中间英国首相布朗右边的，正是中国国家主席胡锦涛，这个位置安排被中国媒体认为是最高的敬意。中国官方媒体喜欢其中潜藏的信息。那就是中国已经占据了中央舞台。

For China the purpose of the G20 summit in London on April 2nd was as much about nudging into place a new alignment of global power as it was about solving the world’s economic problems. In recent years its leaders have been happy, along with those of other large developing countries, to be invited to summits of the G8 group of industrialised economies. But it has shown no interest in formal membership, not least for fear of being in a room full of (mostly) rich democracies.
对于中国而言，出席四月二日在伦敦举行的G20峰会的，除了要解决世界经济问题，同样也希望自己能够跻身于世界强国的行列。最近几年来，中国领导人乐见中国能够与其它几个主要的发展中国家一道受邀出席G8工业国组织峰会。但是，中国对于正式的成员身份却不感兴趣，其中不仅仅是因为对于同世界最主要的富裕民主国家共处一室的恐惧。

The G20, with more than half of its members from the developing world, is a setting in which China feels far more at ease. The convening last November of the first heads of government meeting of the G20 in Washington, where Mr Hu stood to the left of then President George Bush, provided a new springboard for Chinese diplomacy, just at a time when China’s policymakers were beginning to sense that economic disarray in
the West could be turned to China’s strategic advantage.
半数以上成员来自发展中国家的G20是一个令中国感到更加自由的地方。去年11月G20组织在华盛顿召开的第一次政府首脑会议为中国的外交提供了一个跳板，会议上胡锦涛列坐在时任美国总统的布什左边。也从那时起，中国领导人开始感到西方国家的经济混乱可能会给中国带来战略优势。

In London China pressed that advantage most visibly with France, which during the past year has been singled out for opprobrium by Chinese nationalists. Before the G20 gathering, China had not scheduled a meeting between Mr Hu and his French counterpart, Nicolas Sarkozy, even though Mr Hu was to hold bilateral talks with other world leaders, including his first encounter with Barack Obama.
在伦敦，中国使用这种优势最明显的例子是对法国。过去几年间，法国是被中国的民族主义者羞辱最多的对象。在G20峰会之前，胡锦涛已经计划同各国领导人进行双边会谈，其中包括同奥巴马的第一次会谈，但是中国并没有安排胡锦涛同法国总统萨科齐之间的会议。

Mr Sarkozy’s offence had been to meet the Dalai Lama last December. This was the last straw for China after unruly protests by Tibet supporters against an Olympic torch relay through Paris in April 2008 and a threat (unfulfilled) by Mr Sarkozy the previous month that he might boycott the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics in August 2008 because of Chinese behaviour in Tibet. China responded to his meeting with the Dalai Lama by aborting a summit with European Union leaders due to be hosted by France. It is now to be held in late May in the Czech Republic, which has taken over the rotating EU presidency.
萨科齐最近的冒犯行为是他去年12月同Dalai的见面。这对中国来说，这也是08年4月奥运会火炬传递在巴黎遭到Tibet支持者的蛮横抗议和7月萨科齐声称将因为中国在Tibet的行为而可能抵制北京奥运会开幕式（最终未履行）之后压垮两国关系的最后一根稻草。针对萨科齐接见Dalai的做法，中国的反应是取消了由法国主办的中欧领导人峰会。这个峰会将于今年5月在欧盟轮值主席国捷克举行。

Mr Hu’s speech to the G20 was entitled “Co-operating hand-in-hand, pulling together in times of trouble”. But it was only after France had agreed to issue an unusual joint statement with China, setting out the French position on Tibet, that Mr Hu arranged a separate meeting with Mr Sarkozy in London. In the statement, France said it did not support Tibetan independence in “any form” and that it regarded Tibet as an “inseparable” part of China. It fell short of a promise not to meet the Dalai Lama again, but China was clearly pleased by such a formal, explicit rejection of Tibetan independence by a Western power.
胡锦涛在G20峰会上的演讲标题是“在困难时刻，携手合作，齐心协力”。不过是在法中两个和发布了一个不同寻常的共同声明，阐述了法国在Tibet问题上的立场之后，胡锦涛才与萨科齐在伦敦进行了单独的会面。在这个声明中，法国表示不支持任何形式的Tibet独立，并将其视为是中国不可分割的一部分。看起来其中似乎缺少了不再同Dalai会面的承诺，但是中国显然对于这样一个来自于西方国家的正式并且明确反对Tibet独立的声明已经满意了。

Mr Sarkozy, it appears, did not cave in entirely to Mr Hu. During the summit itself the two leaders sparred over whether the G20 should publish a blacklist of tax havens. Mr Hu objected to the idea (apparently fearing that Hong Kong and Macau might end up being tarred). In the end, Mr Obama took them aside separately and got them to agree that the G20 should merely “note” a list of such havens published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The list did not name the two Chinese territories.
看起来萨科齐并没有完全屈服于胡。G20峰会上，两国对于G20是否应该发布一个逃税天堂的黑名单而进行了争论。胡对这个主意持反对意见（显然这是担心香港和澳门将位列名单之中）。最终奥巴马将两人分开并使他们都同意，G20将只是“关注”这个由经合组织发布的名单。名单中也没有点名两个中国的城市。

In the build-up to the G20 meeting, Chinese officials had been unusually forthright about the new economic order they wished to see. The governor of the China’s central bank, Zhou Xiaochuan, had suggested the use of the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights as a new international reserve currency to replace the dollar. He had also pointed out China’s “superior system advantage” when it came to making prompt and effective responses to the financial crisis. At the G20 Mr Hu boasted of the currency swaps totalling 650 billion yuan ($95 billion) that
China has recently pledged to several countries, including Indonesia, Argentina and Belarus. This could result in more trade with these countries being conducted in the Chinese currency.
在G20峰会之前，中国官员不同寻常地表明了他们希望见到的国际经济新秩序。中国中央银行的行长周小川暗示将国际货币基金组织的特别提款权作为新的国际储备货币以取代美元的地位。他同时指出中国良好的系统优势在面对金融危机时迅速而有效的反应。G20峰会上，胡夸耀了中国向包括印尼、阿根廷而白俄罗斯在内的多个国家所允诺的总值达6500亿人民币的货币互换。这将可能导致这些国家产生更多以人民币进行的贸易行为。

Power in reserve

With nearly $2 trillion in foreign currency reserves, China certainly has clout. Mr Hu pledged a loan of $40bn to the IMF, and will expect some dividends when the IMF reviews the voting rights of participants in 2011. China wants a bigger share of them. Mr Hu will be pleased that Western countries appear willing to cede control over appointments of the heads of the IMF and World Bank, traditionally awarded to Europeans and Americans respectively.
拥有超过2万亿美元外汇储备的中国显然具有很大的政治影响力。胡承诺对IMF注资400亿美元，这可能使得中国在2011年IMF重新考虑各国投票权时获得利益。在西方国家可能对于IMF和世界银行的领导人任命问题上控制有所放松的问题，胡将会很高兴。传统上这两个位置将会分别指定给欧洲人和美国人。

But Mr Hu will be satisfied not least with the limelight. Much as Chinese officials coyly dismissed the notion that the meeting of real significance in London was that of the G2—China and America—the official press revelled in the attention he received. Outlook Weekly, a magazine published by China’s state-controlled news agency Xinhua, chose as its cover marking the London summit a picture of only two leaders, Mr Obama and Mr Hu.
但是胡将不会仅仅满足于成为众人的焦点。在伦敦真正重要的会议其实是G2-中国和美国，与中国官员羞怯地避免这种说法相比，官方媒体得意于中国所获得的关注。由官方的新华通讯社出版的瞭望周刊将伦敦峰会的一张照片作为了杂志封面，这张照片上只有2个领导人——奥巴马和胡。